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Competitiveness, Tax Base Erosion, 
and the Essential Dilemma of Corporate Tax Reform 
 
Kimberly A. Clausing∗ 
Label contradicts reality for the U.S. international corporate tax 
system. The U.S. system is typically labeled as a worldwide tax system with 
a statutory rate of 35%, both uncommon features among our trading 
partners. Yet these markers of the U.S. tax system do not accurately 
describe reality, where multinational firms routinely face far lower 
effective tax rates and little, if any, tax is collected on foreign income. 
Understanding this discrepancy between label and reality is essential to 
evaluate recent policy debates surrounding corporate inversions and the 
competitiveness of the U.S. international tax system. Although there is an 
essential policy tradeoff between “competitiveness” (an ill-defined term) 
and corporate tax base protection, there is little evidence that U.S. 
multinational firms have a competitiveness problem. However, new 
evidence shows that corporate tax base erosion is a large and increasing 
problem. There are several options for reform that would address 
corporate tax base erosion. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps fitting within a tradition of American exceptionalism, the 
U.S. tax system is often described as sui generis. Observers repeatedly 
lament that we are the only major country that employs a worldwide 
system of taxation, taxing the foreign income of U.S. multinational 
firms, and that we have one of the highest statutory tax rates in the 
world. From this observation, it is a quick jump to argue that the 
United States should adopt a territorial system of taxation that 
exempts foreign income from taxation, combined with a lower 
statutory rate. 
This Article argues that such a characterization of the nature of 
the current system as well as the desirability of particular reforms is a 
misleading representation of reality. In particular, the U.S. tax system, 
like those of our trading partners, is a hybrid system, with both 
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territorial and worldwide components. Further, while the system is in 
desperate need of reform, the rationale for reform is not what 
adherents to the exceptionalism view hold. In particular, U.S. 
multinational firms do not have a competitiveness problem due to the 
features of our present tax system. However, our system does create 
both perverse incentives and extensive tax base erosion; these issues 
need to be addressed in future reforms. Ideal tax reforms would better 
align the worldwide “label” of the U.S. tax system with the reality on 
the ground, stemming corporate inversions and tax base erosion and 
lowering statutory tax rates while raising effective tax rates. 
II. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: IS THE UNITED STATES SUI 
GENERIS? 
Perhaps the best description of the present U.S. international tax 
system is that we have a “stupid territorial” regime.1 In particular, U.S. 
multinational firms pay little tax on foreign income, but engage in 
inefficient behavior to generate that outcome, and tax base erosion is 
rampant. Several features of our worldwide tax system generate this 
“stupid territorial” outcome. 
One of the biggest issues is deferral, which allows firms to 
accumulate foreign income in low-tax countries without paying U.S. 
tax until that income is repatriated. When income is repatriated, cross-
crediting allows excess tax credits from high-tax countries to offset tax 
that may be due on low-tax country income.2 Also, under our system, 
foreign tax credits can offset tax that would normally be due on royalty 
income, further lowering the tax burden on foreign income. At the 
same time, U.S. multinational firms have more foreign income than 
ever before, in part due to shifting of profits out of the U.S. tax base. 
U.S. multinational firms benefit from rules (such as “check the box”) 
that facilitate the creation of stateless income, and profit shifting out 
of the U.S. tax base has increased dramatically in recent years.3 
 
 1. This is the assessment of President Obama’s Chief Economic Adviser Jason Furman. 
See Jason Furman, Tax Council Policy Inst., Keynote Speech at Tax Council Policy Institute’s 
Tax Symposium (Feb. 20, 2014) (transcript available at https:// www. 
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/transcript_of_furman_keynote_speech_at_tax_counc
il_policy_institutes_tax_symposium.pdf). 
 2. Still, as the U.S. statutory tax rate has increased relative to declining foreign statutory 
tax rates, multinational firms have fewer excess tax credits than in years past. 
 3. See Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 717–24 (2011) 
(detailing elaboration on the generation of stateless income and related policy challenges); 
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Given the parameters of the U.S. tax system just described, one 
could easily argue that our system is a hybrid system. Indeed, most 
major countries of the world have hybrid tax systems with territorial 
and worldwide components. For example, many purportedly 
territorial countries tax foreign income more heavily than the United 
States system does, due in part to base protection laws that tax some 
foreign income currently. Also, foreign tax credits are not available to 
shield some types of foreign income, such as royalty income, from 
domestic taxation. 
In order to assess a country’s tax system, it is perhaps most useful 
to think of all tax systems as lying on a spectrum between a pure 
territorial system and a pure worldwide system. I have argued that 
several criteria determine where on this spectrum countries are placed, 
as summarized in Table 1.4 
Table 1: The Spectrum 
 Pure 
Territorial 
System 
Hybrid 
(in between systems) 
Pure 
Worldwide 
System 
1. Share of Foreign 
Income Taxed 
 
0% 
 
=> Increasing => 
 
100% 
2. Effective Tax 
Burden on Foreign 
Income 
 
0% 
 
=> Increasing => 
 
Domestic 
Tax Rate 
3.Tax Consequences 
of Repatriation 
Not Tax 
Relevant 
=> Increasing tax 
influence => then 
dropping to zero again 
Not Tax 
Relevant 
4. Relative Incentive 
to Earn Income in 
Low-Tax Countries 
 
High 
 
=> Decreasing => 
 
None 
Under a pure territorial system, foreign income is completely 
exempt from taxation, giving multinational firms a large incentive to 
earn income in (or shift income to) low-tax destinations. Under a pure 
 
Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 TAX L. REV. 99, 107–09  (2011); see 
also Kimberly A. Clausing, The Effect of Profit Shifting on the Corporate Tax Base in the United 
States and Beyond, 69 NAT’L TAX J. (forthcoming Dec. 2016) (estimating profit shifting and its 
effect on the U.S. tax base). 
 4. Portions of the text describing features of the table are excerpted from Kimberly 
Clausing, Beyond Territorial and Worldwide Systems of Tax, 15 J. INT’L FIN. & ECON. 43 (2015). 
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worldwide system, all foreign income is taxed currently at the 
domestic tax rate, so multinational firms would have no incentive to 
shift income to low-tax countries and repatriation would be 
undeterred by tax burdens (since the tax would already be paid). Of 
course, the United States is quite far away from the pure worldwide 
end of the spectrum. Less appreciated, perhaps, is the fact that 
purportedly territorial countries are also far away from the pure 
territorial end of the spectrum. 
First, consider the share of foreign income that is taxed. Many 
territorial countries have controlled foreign corporation (CFC) laws 
that seek to limit abusive tax avoidance by currently taxing foreign 
income. The Joint Committee on Taxation provides detail on other 
countries’ CFC laws.5 Some countries (e.g., France, Germany, Italy, 
and Japan) have very broad CFC laws that go beyond currently taxing 
passive foreign income; active foreign income is also currently taxed, 
when such income is insufficiently taxed in the source country.6 The 
French benchmark for insufficient taxation is less than half the French 
rate; the Japanese benchmark is less than twenty percent.7 Beyond 
CFC laws, many territorial countries have other provisions aimed at 
countering corporate tax base erosion that may affect the taxation of 
foreign income, including thin capitalization (earnings stripping) 
rules, which are widely used.8 Indeed, many territorial countries tax 
some foreign income. 
The United States exempts much foreign income from tax, since 
foreign income that is reinvested abroad can escape home taxation 
indefinitely. Cross-crediting can also reduce the domestic taxation of 
foreign income, and tax credits from dividends can offset tax that 
would otherwise be due on other sources of foreign income, such as 
royalty income. Thus, it is quite possible that a move to a territorial 
system could raise rather than lower the share of foreign income that 
is taxed. Further, U.S. multinational firms have become particularly 
adept at generating stateless income, income that goes untaxed in 
any jurisdiction. 
 
 5. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH CONG., BACKGROUND AND 
SELECTED ISSUES RELATED TO THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX SYSTEM AND SYSTEMS THAT 
EXEMPT FOREIGN BUSINESS INCOME 14-45 (Comm. Print 2011). 
 6. Id. at 22–30. 
 7. Id. at 29. 
 8. Id. at 14–15, 19, 28, 32, 36, 43. 
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Second, consider the effective tax rates paid on foreign income. In 
studies of multinational firm effective tax rates, there is no pattern that 
distinguishes purportedly territorial countries from purportedly 
worldwide countries.9 Studies differ on where the United States fits 
relative to peer countries. Avi-Yonah and Lahav find that U.S. 
multinational corporations (MNCs) have effective tax rates that are 
lower than MNCs based in the European Union.10 Markle and 
Shackelford find that the United States has relatively high effective tax 
rates.11 It is important to note that these calculations are more 
complicated than they might seem, and effective tax rates vary a great 
deal depending on methodological issues and individual firm 
circumstances.12 Indeed, many U.S. multinational firms have achieved 
single digit tax rates, including Pfizer, prior to their 
planned inversion.13 
 
 9. See, e.g., Kevin S. Markle & Douglas A Shackelford, Cross-Country Comparisons of the 
Effects of Leverage, Intangible Assets, and Tax Havens on Corporate Income Taxes, 65 TAX L. REV. 
415, 416 (2012) (performing a regression analysis of the determinants of effective tax rates for 
over 11,000 public corporations from 82 countries during the period 1988–2009 and finding 
that firms resident in countries with a worldwide tax system have lower effective tax rates than 
firms resident in countries with a territorial tax system, controlling for other factors); see also 
Giorgia Maffini, Territoriality, Worldwide Principle, and Competitiveness of Multinationals: A 
Firm-Level Analysis of Tax Burdens (Oxford CBT Working Paper No. 12/10, 2012) (analyzing 
ORBIS firm-level data for over 3000 companies in 15 OECD countries over the period 2003 to 
2007 and concluding that although worldwide countries do tend to have higher statutory rates 
than territorial countries in this sample, controlling for statutory tax rates in the home country, 
there is no difference in the effective tax rates of firms operating under a worldwide versus 
territorial tax system). 
 10. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Yaron Lahav, The Effective Tax Rates of the Largest U.S. and 
EU Multinationals, 65 TAX L. REV. 375, 383 (2012). 
 11. See Markle & Shackelford, supra note 9, at 421. 
 12. For example, the General Accounting Office found that “[f]or tax year 2010 (the 
most recent year with information available), profitable U.S. corporations that filed a Schedule 
M-3 paid U.S. federal income taxes amounting to about 13 percent of the pretax worldwide 
income that they reported in their financial statements.” GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS: EFFECT TAX RATES CAN DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY 
FROM THE STATUTORY RATE 1 (2013). The rate is higher if foreign and state and local income 
taxes are included, at 17%. Id. If firms with losses are included, that raises the effective tax rate 
averages further, to about 16% at the federal level, and about 22% inclusive of other taxes. Id. 
 13. Pfizer has a 7.5% effective tax rate. AMERICANS FOR TAX FAIRNESS, PFIZER’S TAX 
DODGING RX: STASH PROFITS OFFSHORE (2015), http://www.americanfortaxfairness.org/
pfizers-tax-dodging-rx-stash-profits-offshore/. Many other companies have achieved 
comparably low rates. See, e.g., Christopher Helman, What The Top U.S. Companies Pay In Taxes, 
FORBES (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/04/01/ge-exxon-walmart-business-
washington-corporate-taxes.html. 
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One clear point is that the United States raises very little additional 
revenue by taxing the foreign income of its resident firms. In part, this 
is due to the fact that: (1) foreign income is rarely repatriated in a 
manner that generates foreign tax payments, and (2) tax credits from 
dividends shield other foreign income from taxation.14 Data from 
other countries is less complete, but the U.K. Treasury estimated a 
very low cost of moving to territorial taxation—less than one percent 
of the corporate tax liability—due to the fact that very little revenue 
was collected on repatriated dividends under their prior 
worldwide system.15 
Third, consider repatriation incentives. Here, differences in tax 
systems are larger. In theory, there should be no tax incentive affecting 
repatriation decisions in either a pure territorial system or a pure 
worldwide system. However, since actual worldwide systems typically 
allow domestic tax on foreign income to be deferred until repatriation, 
this creates a “lock out” effect whereby firms will be reluctant to 
repatriate dividends from low-tax countries due to the tax cost 
associated with bringing the money home. Absent deferral, this is not 
an issue. 
Still, even with deferral, there should not be a tax disincentive on 
repatriation for mature firms. If the ultimate U.S. taxation of income 
earned in low-tax countries is inevitable, then repatriation taxes should 
not affect the decisions of mature firms regarding whether to reinvest 
 
 14. As Altshuler and Grubert report, using 2006 data, only $32 billion is collected on all 
foreign source income, amounting to less than 4% of foreign income. Harry Grubert & Rosanne 
Altshuler, Fixing the System: An Analysis of Alternative Proposals for the Reform of International 
Tax, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 671, 695 (2013).  
“But the amount raised from dividends represents only a very small portion of this 
revenue. Indeed, if dividends are removed from taxable foreign income total U.S. tax 
revenue increases by about one billion. The dividends taxable on the margin after 
credits are more than offset by the credits originating with dividends that currently 
spill over to other income.” Id. 
Gravelle makes a similar point using 2007 and 2008 data. Effective tax rates on all foreign 
income were 7% in 2007 and 5% in 2008, but royalties were shielded from tax by excess credits. 
Without this effect, tax revenues would have been higher. JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R42624, MOVING TO A TERRITORIAL INCOME TAX: OPTIONS AND CHALLENGES 10–
11 (2012). 
 15. Li Liu, International Taxation and MNE Investment: Evidence from the UK Change 
to Territoriality 6–7 (June 10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://www. 
sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Events/conferences/symposia/2015/liu-
paper4.pdf. 
1649 Competitiveness, Tax Base Erosion, and the Essential Dilemma 
 1655 
funds abroad or repatriate.16 The decision between reinvestment and 
repatriation depends on the relative returns of the two investment 
options; the tax cost of repatriating funds is incurred irrespective of 
whether one reinvests the funds or repatriates them.17 Yet in the case 
of temporary changes in the tax cost of repatriation, this result no 
longer holds. For example, if there is a temporary holiday for dividend 
repatriation, one would expect increased repatriations during the 
holiday and reduced repatriations in the surrounding periods. Further, 
the mere expectation of holidays or changes in tax treatment can make 
investors tax sensitive in their repatriation decisions. 
Substantial evidence confirms that firms respond to these 
temporary changes in tax costs.18 Many argue that the current buildup 
of un-repatriated foreign income by U.S. multinational firms is due to 
anticipation of future holidays or, perhaps, U.S. adoption of a 
territorial system. Under a territorial system, there should be no tax 
disincentive affecting dividend repatriation. Yet there are caveats in 
practice. As the Joint Committee on Taxation notes, many other 
conditions might still distort repatriation decisions even if the United 
States adopted a territorial system.19 
Finally, consider the incentive to earn income in low-tax countries. 
While in theory, MNCs residing in territorial countries should face 
greater incentives to earn income in low-tax countries (compared to 
MNCs residing in worldwide countries), in practice, empirical work 
 
16. David G. Hartman, Tax Policy and Foreign Direct Investment, 26 J. PUB. ECON. 107, 
115–18 (1985). 
 17. Kimberly A. Clausing, Tax Holidays (and Other Escapes) in the American Jobs Creation 
Act, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 331, 333–35 (2005) (referring to result discussed in Hartman, supra note 
16), provides a more detailed development of this point. Also note that the Hartman result only 
applies to mature firms. Immature firms may have an incentive to underinvest in order to take 
full advantage of deferral. 
 18. See generally DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R40178, TAX CUTS ON REPATRIATION EARNINGS AS ECONOMIC STIMULUS: AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS (2011). 
 19. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 5, at 84. Under a territorial system, 
tax distortions to repatriation would occur under several possible conditions: if dividends were 
not wholly exempt, if not all levels of foreign ownership generated exemption, or if foreign 
earnings were required to have been subject to tax in order to qualify for exemption. In part for 
these reasons, the predicted effects on repatriation from adoption of a territorial system are 
typically small. Gravelle notes that the effects of the recent adoptions of territorial systems in 
Japan and the U.K. were modest. GRAVELLE, supra note 14, at 14. Given the perceived 
permanence of these changes, this could be due to the Hartman result; taxpayers are most 
responsive to temporary changes that affect the relative cost of repatriating dividends at a 
particular time. See Hartman, supra note 16 and related text. 
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on this question has been difficult due to the problem of 
distinguishing country tax systems when many countries have hybrid 
systems. The evidence on this question is therefore mixed, although 
meta-analyses by De Mooij and Ederveen confirmed a higher tax 
elasticity for studies based on territorial tax systems.20 In the 2003 
meta-analysis, they conclude that studies using data from territorial 
countries exhibit more tax responsiveness than studies using data from 
worldwide countries, although this outcome does not persist if one 
eliminates extreme findings.21 The 2008 meta-analysis also finds that 
studies based on territorial countries (162 of the semi-elasticities) have 
higher elasticities than those based on worldwide countries (118 semi-
elasticities).22 The point estimate of the semi-elasticity difference 
between the two groups of studies is about 1.0. 
There are far fewer studies that consider how tax systems affect 
income-shifting behavior. One exception is Markle; using data from 
ORBIS over the period 2004–2008. Markle finds that multinationals 
based in territorial countries shift more income than those in 
worldwide countries.23 The difference is limited to the subset of firms 
that are financially constrained; there is no difference in income 
shifting behavior for the subsample of firms that are not financially 
constrained. Similarly, Dyreng and Markle find that financially 
constrained multinational firms would increase outbound income 
shifting if the United States were to adopt a territorial system.24 
III. AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND CORPORATE INVERSIONS 
As Part II demonstrates, most countries have a hybrid system of 
international taxation where some types of foreign income are taxed 
under some circumstances. The most important difference between 
purportedly territorial and purportedly worldwide systems of taxation 
 
20. Ruud A. de Mooij & Sjef Ederveen, Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment: A 
Synthesis of Empirical Research, 10 INT’L TAX & FIN. 673, 687 (2003). 
21. Id. 
22. Ruud A. de Mooji & Sjef Ederveen, Corporate Tax Elasticities: A Reader’s Guide to 
Empirical Findings, 24 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 680, 692 (2008). 
23. Kevin Markle, A Comparison of the Tax-Motivated Income Shifting of Multinationals 
in Territorial and Worldwide Countries 28 (Sept. 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1764031. 
24. Scott D. Dyreng & Kevin Markle, The Effect of Financial Constraints on Tax-
Motivated Income Shifting by U.S. Multinationals 31 (May 14, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2336997. 
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concerns repatriation incentives and the related problem of profit 
shifting incentives. 
Estimates indicate that about two trillion dollars are held by U.S. 
corporations abroad (as permanently reinvested earnings),25 about half 
of which is in cash.26 These profits have accumulated over time due to 
booking income in low-tax countries. Un-repatriated earnings are 
often held in U.S. financial institutions, and are thus available to U.S. 
capital markets, but U.S. MNCs are constrained in their use of these 
funds. These funds are assets of the firm that increase the firm’s 
creditworthiness; however, firms cannot return the cash to 
shareholders as dividends or share repurchases without incurring U.S. 
corporate tax liabilities upon repatriation. 
In the past, the multinational community succeded in lobbying for 
a repatriation holiday as part of the American Jobs Creation Act of 
2004. Yet there is consensus among economists that, despite the 
hopeful title of the legislation, the holiday did not increase jobs or 
investment in the United States, but instead fueled dividends and 
share repurchases.27 This has made it difficult to argue for a repeat 
performance of the holiday. Instead corporations have argued that the 
United States should follow other countries and adopt a territorial 
system of taxation, removing the repatriation tax and exempting 
future foreign income from taxation. 
If the United States were to move to a pure territorial system, it 
would avoid the repatriation lock-out problem. However, this 
approach would increase the already large incentive to shift profit 
toward low-tax countries, since there would no longer be any 
constraint on profit shifting due to anticipated tax burdens upon 
repatriation. Indeed, the repatriation tax acts as a natural limit to the 
amount of profit shifting multinational corporations may do, since 
they fear accumulating large amounts of income abroad that cannot 
be used for dividends or share repurchases without triggering U.S. tax. 
Thus, eliminating the U.S. tax upon repatriation also eliminates the 
 
25. Maxwell Murphy, Indefinitely Reinvested Foreign Earnings on the Rise, WALL ST. J.: 
CFO J. (May 7, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2013/05/07/indefinitely-reinvested-
foreign-earnings-on-the-rise/. 
26. Edward D. Kleinbard, Tax Inversions Must Be Stopped Now, WALL ST. J., July 
21, 2014. 
 27. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 18, at 3; PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., REPATRIATING OFFSHORE FUNDS: 2004 TAX WINDFALL FOR 
SELECT MULTINATIONALS  (2011). 
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remaining constraint on profit shifting behavior, turbocharging 
incentives to shift profits abroad. 
Note that there are other steps, beyond territoriality, that would 
diminish the lock-out problem. As Hartman shows, a repatriation tax 
that is presumed to be permanent would create much smaller lock-out 
effects;28 it is the prospect of more favorable tax treatment in the future 
that makes firms reluctant to incur the tax costs of repatriation. Policy 
uncertainty is a key part of the problem. 
Of course, another way to handle repatriation lock-out would be 
to simply tax foreign income currently by ending deferral. Since this 
change would raise the tax burden on foreign income, a plausible 
compromise might be to tax foreign income currently, but at a lower 
rate, or through a system of minimum taxes. 
Still, many multinational business interests favor a territorial 
system of taxation, and if such a system is not forthcoming, some have 
threatened to pursue corporate inversions, effectively “self-helping” to 
the tax reform outcome they desire. For example, Carl Icahn, the 
billionaire investor who recently pledged $150 million to launch a 
super PAC aimed at such tax reforms,29 claims that there will soon be 
a flood of corporate inversions, unless Congress creates a more 
“competitive” corporate tax code.30 
Indeed, the recent spate of corporate inversions had a clear motive. 
Multinational firms want easier access to the $2 trillion in foreign 
earnings held abroad. But equally important, corporate inversions ease 
future profit shifting through earnings stripping. Earnings stripping 
occurs when corporations use loans between the new foreign parent 
and the U.S. affiliate to shift income out of the United States. This 
happens by leveraging the U.S. company, through internal loans 
within the multinational corporation, up to the limits set by the rules 
of earnings stripping provisions in section 163(j) of the Internal 
Revenue Code.31 Inverted corporations will be able to shift income 
 
 28. See Hartman, supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 29. Rebecca Ballhaus, Carl Icahn to Invest $150 Million in Super PAC, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 
21, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/carl-icahn-to-invest-150-million-in-super-pac-
1445441825. 
 30. Carl C. Icahn, How to Stop Turning U.S. Corporations Into Tax Exiles, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/14/opinion/how-to-stop-turning-us-
corporations-into-tax-exiles.html. 
 31. I.R.C. § 163(j) (2012). 
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out of the United States without running afoul of these provisions.32 
For example, with these sorts of strategies, estimates suggest a planned 
inversion transaction could have saved Walgreens over $780 million in 
taxes in one year alone.33 
Yet corporate inversions do not reveal anything about the tax 
competitiveness of the U.S. multinational corporations that undertake 
them, since these incentives to undertake corporate inversions are not 
resulting from higher effective tax rates for U.S. based multinational 
firms, nor from the fact that more foreign income is taxed. Instead, 
inversions result from perverse features of the U.S. tax system—in 
particular, the combination of deferral and limited earnings 
stripping rules. 
Systematic corporate tax reforms could address the problems of 
repatriation lock-out and corporate inversions, among other key 
reform objectives. Yet as we wait for systematic reforms, there are still 
many policy tools that are capable of addressing inversions.34 For 
example, recent treasury regulations have made inversions more 
difficult by addressing “hopscotch” loans and reducing some types of 
earnings stripping. But more could be done, including increasing the 
legal standard for a foreign affiliate to become a parent to fifty percent 
ownership of the newly merged company. In addition, U.S. 
corporations could be disallowed from moving abroad for tax 
purposes if they remain managed and controlled in the United States 
or if the corporation does not do significant business in the country it 
claims as its new home. 
Another area that could be revised in response to inversions is the 
earnings striping rules under section 163(j). Since one of the key 
drivers behind inversions is facilitating the subsequent shifting of 
income out of the U.S. tax base, tightening these rules would reduce 
the lure of inversion. Sullivan has cataloged many previous proposals 
 
 32. The same logic holds for foreign-headquartered firms more generally. See Stephen E. 
Shay, Mr. Secretary, Take the Tax Juice out of Corporate Expatriations, 144 TAX NOTES 473 (July 
28, 2014). 
 33. Walgreens explored the possibility of a corporate inversion but decided against 
expatriation. Seida and Wempe find evidence that firms’ effective tax rates decline following 
inversion because of income shifting through changes in intercompany debt (see Jim A. Seida & 
William F. Wempe, Effective Tax Rate Changes and Earnings Stripping Following Corporate 
Inversion, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 805 (2004)). 
 34. These are discussed in more detail in, KIMBERLY A. CLAUSING, TAX POLICY CENTER,  
CORPORATE INVERSIONS (2014). This borrows from that discussion. 
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to tighten these rules.35 Such changes to earnings stripping provisions 
would also help address the profit shifting problem more generally, 
including in cases in which multinational firms have not inverted. 
Finally, an exit tax would be a key anti-inversion policy tool. The 
tax would be levied on repatriating companies, based on the U.S. tax 
due on outstanding stocks of income that have not been repatriated.36 
These anti-inversion measures are likely to be effective, and they 
could also be enacted retroactively.37 Of course, systematic corporate 
tax reform could also address the tax incentives behind corporate 
inversions, in addition to other even more important desiderata, such 
as reducing the economic distortions under the present system and 
protecting the corporate tax base. Part V evaluates options for reform 
in detail. 
IV. COMPETITIVENESS AND CORPORATE TAX BASE EROSION 
“Competitiveness” is a vague and ill-defined concept. In corporate 
tax debates, the term is used to capture only a very narrow aspect of 
competitiveness, the corporate tax facet of the overall ability of a 
multinational firm to compete. Of course, there are many other 
variables that affect a firm’s ability to compete, including, but not 
limited to, the exchange rate, the firm’s financial constraints, and the 
unique organization and internalization advantages of the particular 
firm. In addition, the attractiveness of a particular country as a location 
for production depends on much more than its corporate tax 
environment: its market size, infrastructure, government services, 
legal institutions, regulation, labor productivity, labor costs, 
geography, and other factors. Indeed, these other aspects of a 
 
 35. See Martin Sullivan, Economic Analysis: The Many Ways to Limit Earnings Stripping, 
144 TAX NOTES 377 (July 28, 2014). 
 36. For elaboration, see Daniel Shaviro, Understanding and responding to corporate 
inversions, DANSHAVIRO.BLOGSPOT.COM, (July 28, 2014),  
http://danshaviro.blogspot.com/2014/07/understanding-and-responding-to.html. 
Shareholders still pay capital gains taxes under typical inversion deals since the merger creates a 
realization event, but exit taxes would affect tax at the corporate level. Of course, many capital 
gains are not taxed at the individual level if the shareholder is tax-exempt (e.g., nonprofits, 
pensions, and annuities). 
 37. There are good arguments for retroactivity. For example, the prospect of retroactivity 
would deter current plans for new inversions, thus avoiding situations in which firms rush to 
complete inversions before legislation is enacted. Retroactivity would also reduce the “tilt” of 
the playing field in favor of firms that had already successfully completed inversions before 
the legislation. 
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country’s (or a firm’s) competitiveness may be far more important for 
national welfare than the tax facet of multinational firm competition. 
Turning to the question of tax competitiveness, it is far from clear 
that U.S. multinational firms are disadvantaged. Much foreign income 
goes untaxed, and effective tax rates are on par with those in many 
trading partner countries. Our multinational firms are also world 
leaders in tax avoidance, and, as a result, they often achieve single-
digit effective tax rates, making them the envy of the world in terms 
of tax planning competitiveness.38 
By other conventional measure of competitiveness, U.S. 
multinational corporations are healthy and thriving. As Figure 1 
shows, corporate profits as a share of GDP in recent years are higher 
than at any point in the last fifty years.  
 
  
 
38. Edward D. Kleinbard, ‘Competitiveness’ Has Nothing to Do With It, 144 TAX NOTES 
1055, 1057 (2014) (describing this phenomenon in detail). 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
1662 
Figure 1: Corporate Profits as a Share of GDP, 1960–201439 
 
The United States is also home to a disproportionate share of the 
Forbes Global 2000 list of the world’s most important corporations. 
As Figure 2 shows, the U.S. share of world GDP in 2014 (in dollar 
terms) is 22%, and the U.S. share of GDP in PPP terms (which 
accounts for different prices levels in different countries) is 16%. Yet 
the U.S. share of the world’s biggest firms is far higher: 29% by count, 
31% by sales, 35% by profits (consolidated worldwide), 24% by assets, 
and 42% by market capitalization. 
 
  
 
 39. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Corporate Profits After Tax (without IVA and 
CCAdj)/Gross Domestic Product, FED. RESERVE BANK ST. LOUIS, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=cSh. 
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Figure 2: 2014 Data on U.S. Share of Forbes Global 2000 
Firms (and world GDP) 
 
Still, competitiveness concerns are often voiced as the key impetus 
for moving the U.S. tax system toward a pure territorial system, or 
absent that policy change, the necessity of “self-help” tax reform by 
corporate inversion.40 Those in the multinational community that 
argue for a more “competitive” tax system are explicitly arguing for a 
lighter tax burden to enable U.S. multinational firms to “compete” 
with those based in other countries. Thus, when advocating for a 
territorial system of taxation, business interests are certainly in favor 
of moving toward the territorial end of the tax policy spectrum. But 
they are unlikely to suggest a “tough” territorial system such as those 
used by some of our trading partners since such a system would, on 
net, increase the taxation of foreign income. Robinson notes that a 
well-designed territorial system has potential to be as burdensome, if 
not more so, on a U.S. multinational firm than the current poorly-
 
 40. See Icahn, supra note 30. 
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designed worldwide system.41 Adopting the label of territoriality could 
still move the U.S. system toward the worldwide end of the spectrum. 
Systematic tax reforms will face a tradeoff between two essential 
desiderata: corporate “competitiveness” and tax base protection. The 
narrow version of competitiveness used in corporate tax policy debates 
leads business interests to push for moves toward the territorial end of 
the spectrum. Yet moves in this direction can exacerbate concerns 
about efficient capital allocation and tax base protection. Such 
concerns would favor moves toward the worldwide end of 
the spectrum.42 
Indeed, a more “competitive” U.S. tax system will likely make the 
already large corporate tax base erosion problem larger by increasing 
the incentive to book income in low-tax countries due to the (even) 
lighter tax burden that would be placed on those earnings. Yet the 
evidence indicates a very substantial tax base erosion problem at 
present. For example, my recent research suggests that, by 2012, 
profit shifting will generate an annual revenue cost to the U.S. 
government of between $77 and $111 billion.43 Extrapolating to 
2015 at a 5% growth rate, this implies losses that are likely in excess of 
$100 billion per year.44 Figure 3 shows how this cost has increased 
dramatically in recent years. This increase is due to the increasing 
foreign profits of U.S. multinational firms as well as the increased 
discrepancy between U.S. tax rates and foreign tax rates, due to 
steadily diminishing foreign tax rates.45 
 
 
 41. See The U.S. Tax Code: Love It, Leave It, or Reform It: Hearing before the S. Comm. On 
Finance, 113th Cong. 13 (2014) (statement of Leslie Robinson). Grubert and Mutti, for 
example, design a territorial system that would result in an overall higher tax burden on income 
generated in low-tax countries. HARRY GRUBERT & JOHN MUTTI, TAXING INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS INCOME: DIVIDEND EXEMPTION VERSUS THE CURRENT SYSTEM 3–4 (2001). See 
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 5, at 86 for a discussion of this point. 
 42. These concepts go back to Musgrave’s conceptions of capital export neutrality and 
capital import neutrality. PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT INCOME: ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS 108–38 (1969). 
 43. Clausing, supra note 3, at 2. 
 44. Kimberly Clausing, Profit Shifting and U.S. Corporate Tax Policy Reform, 
WASHINGTON CENTER FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH, May 2016, at 13 & n.12, http://cdn. 
equitablegrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/05115111/051016-clausing-profit-
shifting.pdf. 
 45. The increase is not due to the increased tax sensitivity of foreign profits (since that 
elasticity is held constant in this analysis). 
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Figure 3: Estimates of Revenue Loss due to Income Shifting, 
billions U.S.D (estimates using U.S. BEA gross income 
series and direct investment earnings series) 
 
These estimates are explained in detail in another study by the 
author.46 That analysis uses survey data on U.S. multinational firms’ 
operations to estimate the size of the U.S. tax base absent profit 
shifting. It does this by first estimating the tax sensitivity of U.S. 
multinational firms’ taxable income to tax differences across countries, 
controlling for other features of countries that may generate different 
levels of corporate profits. It then calculates how much “excess” (or 
deficit) profits are earned in low-tax (or high-tax) countries relative to 
what profits would be without such profit shifting incentives. Profits 
by affiliates of U.S. multinational firms in low-tax countries are shown 
to be much higher than would be expected absent the incentive to 
shift income to low-tax destinations.47 Table 2 shows the countries 
where the greatest profit shifting is occurring. 
 
  
 
46. Clausing, supra note 3. 
47. Id. 
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Table 2: Key Locations of Profit Shifting, 201248 
Country Gross 
Income 
Reported, 
$ billions 
Estimate of 
Gross Income 
without 
Shifting, $ 
billion 
% of Total 
Excess 
Income in 
Location 
    
Netherlands 172.3 33.0 23.0% 
Ireland 122.3 23.6 16.3% 
Luxembourg 96.1 15.0 13.4% 
Bermuda 79.7 9.9 11.5% 
Switzerland 57.9 14.6 7.2% 
Singapore 42.4 10.5 5.3% 
UK (Caymans) 40.9 8.7 5.3% 
All Others Under 15% 188.6 89.8 16.3% 
  
   
Total Under 15% 800 205 98.4% 
All Others with Data49 267 257 1.6% 
 
Then, a fraction (39% in 2012)50 of this “excess” income in tax 
havens and other low-tax countries is attributed to the United States 
tax base, where it is assumed to be taxed at 30%. (This assumption 
allows for some degree of base narrowing relative to the statutory tax 
rate.) These estimates also take into account profit shifting by foreign 
multinational firms. The estimates use the best publicly available data, 
careful methodology, and conservative assumptions.51 The estimates 
are supported by similar findings by researchers at the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), International 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Note that the total of gross income in 2012 ($1,219 billion) is larger than the income 
that is reported in particular countries analyzed here ($1,067 billion); some income is earned in 
“other” countries that are not designated. 
 50. This is based on the share of foreign affiliate transactions that occur with the United 
States compared to other foreign countries. 
 51. See Clausing, supra note 3, for a detailed discussion of the assumptions used in the 
analysis, as well as alternative calculations that account for the range of estimates. 
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Monetary Fund (IMF), Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), 
and elsewhere.52 
Indeed, even a look at the raw data is sufficient to illustrate the 
large magnitude of the profit shifting problem. U.S. affiliate firm 
profits were 645% of Bermuda’s GDP and 547% of the Cayman 
Islands GDP in 2004.53 As absurd as these numbers are, they increased 
to 1,614% for Bermuda and 2,065% for the Caymans by 2010. Figure 
4 shows the top ten locations of U.S. multinational firm affiliate gross 
profits in 2012 (gross profits are net income with foreign income tax 
payments added).54 
  
 
 52. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], Measuring 
and Monitoring BEPS, Action 11 - 2015 Final Report (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/
9789264241343-en (last visited Oct. 27, 2016); Ernesto Crivelli, Ruud de Mooij & Michael 
Keen, Base Erosion, Profit Shifting and Developing Countries (International Monetary Fund, 
Working Paper 15/118, 2015), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1
5118.pdf; Mark P. Keightley & Jeffrey M. Stupak, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44013, 
CORPORATE TAX BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHARING (BEPS): AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
DATA, (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44013.pdf; Tim Dowd, Paul 
Landefeld & Anne Moore, Profit Shifting of U.S. Multinationals (Jan. 6, 2016) (forthcoming) 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2711968; Gabriel Zucman, Taxing across Borders: Tracking Personal 
Wealth and Corporate Profits, 28 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 4, 121–48 (2014); GABRIEL ZUCMAN, 
THE HIDDEN WEALTH OF NATIONS: THE SCOURGE OF TAX HAVENS, (Teresa Lavender Fagan 
trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2015); and many earlier studies reviewed in de Mooij & Ederveen, 
supra note 22. 
 53. Jane G. Gravelle, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40523, TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL 
TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 18, (Jan. 15, 2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/R40623.pdf. Similar stylized facts regarding the scale of the problem are reported by many 
sources, including Mark P. Keightley, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AN ANALYSIS OF WHERE 
AMERICAN COMPANIES REPORT PROFITS: INDICATIONS OF PROFIT SHARING (Jan. 18, 2013), 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/1006/ and Robert S. McIntyre, 
Richard Phillips & Pineas Baxandall, Offshore Shell Games: The Use of Offshore Tax Havens by 
Fortune 500 Companies, OSPIRG (Oct. 2015), http://ctj.org/pdf/offshoreshell2015.pdf. 
 54. There is a lag in data availability, so at the time of analysis, 2012 was the most recent 
year. Other recent years display similar patterns. 
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Figure 4: Top Gross Income Countries, Affiliates of U.S. 
Multinational Firms, 2012 (as share of Total Income)55 
 
Of the top ten locations, seven of them are tax havens with 
effective tax rates less than 5%: Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Bermuda, Switzerland, Singapore, and the UK Caribbean Islands 
(including the Caymans). Effective tax rates are calculated as foreign 
income taxes paid by all affiliates in a given country relative to their 
income (net income plus foreign tax payments). These countries alone 
account for 50% of all foreign income earned by affiliates of U.S. 
multinational firms, but they only account for 5% of all foreign 
employment of such firms. Further, the economic size of these 
countries is quite small relative to this disproportionate profit; their 
combined population is less than that of either Spain or California.56 
 
 55. Clausing, supra note 3. 
 56. The data includes “income from equity investments”, some of which are counted 
more than once if there are tiers of ownership within the same country. Unfortunately, with 
existing data, it is not possible to account for this double-counting accurately. Still, one can use 
an alternative data series, also from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, on direct investment 
earnings. This series eliminates the possibility of double counting, but it is also incomplete, since 
income from investments is excluded. Still, if one uses that series instead, the same seven 
countries with low effective tax rates are in the top ten countries: Netherlands, Ireland, Bermuda, 
Luxembourg, Singapore, the Cayman Islands, and Switzerland. Together, they account for 52% 
of all foreign direct investment earnings. 
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As noted above, estimates indicate that U.S. multinational firms 
have accumulated over $2 trillion in permanently reinvested earnings 
in low-tax locations, about half of which is held in cash. Due to the 
large amounts of income booked in low-tax countries and havens, the 
estimated costs of deferral have been increasing in recent years, and 
the JCT now estimates this tax expenditure at $83.4 billion for 2014. 
OMB estimates are somewhat lower, at $61.7 billion in 2014.57 
The United States is not the only country with a corporate tax 
base erosion problem.58 Table 3 shows that other countries are also 
likely to face important corporate tax base erosion problems: 
Table 3: Estimates of Corporate Tax Base Erosion for 
Selected Countries, 201259 
 
 
Estimated 
Profits in 
17 low-
tax 
Countries, 
$ billion 
Effective 
Tax Rate 
(Combined 
Statutory 
Rate - 5%) 
Excess 
Income 
Booked in 
Low-tax 
Countries,  
$ billion 
Revenue 
Loss 
(effective 
tax rate * 
share of 
group 
GDP * 
$1,076b), 
$ billion 
Share 
of all 
Corporate 
Revenue, 
including 
subfederal 
Australia 67.7 25% 36.3 7.4 9% 
Brazil 71.1 29% 46.4 13.5 17% 
China 204.5 20% 79.7 32.7 11% 
Czech R. 1.9 14% 0.4 0.6 8% 
Denmark 7.2 20% 2.8 1.3 13% 
Finland 5.3 20% 2.0 1.0 18% 
France  90.5 29% 60.2 15.3 23% 
Germany 80.4 25% 43.5 17.2 28% 
Greece 2.2 15% 0.5 0.7 26% 
India 55.0 27% 33.3 9.7 14% 
 
 57. This represents the estimated revenue cost associated with allowing deferral of the 
U.S. tax on foreign income until it is repatriated. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 
Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2014–2018, https://www.jct. 
gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4663 and OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, Fiscal 
Year 2016 Analytical Perspectives of the U.S. Government, https://www. whitehouse. 
gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2016/assets/spec.pdf. 
 58. Clausing, supra note 3. 
 59. Id. 
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Indonesia 7.4 20% 2.9 3.6 8% 
Italy 31.0 23% 14.3 9.0 16% 
Japan 129.9 35% 105.7 39.8 18% 
Norway 19.2 23% 9.2 2.3 4% 
Poland 8.4 14% 1.8 1.3 13% 
Portugal 8.2 27% 4.7 1.1 19% 
Russia 86.7 15% 21.1 5.8 7% 
S Africa 21.6 25% 11.3 1.9 9% 
S. Korea 56.9 19% 20.8 4.5 10% 
Spain 33.1 25% 17.7 6.6 24% 
Turkey 10.6 15% 2.6 2.3 14% 
U.S.  800.2 30% 545.3 93.8 26% 
      
Total 1,836  1,076 279 20.1% 
Note: For countries other than the United States, the tax rate is the 
combined rate of federal and sub-federal rates (when countries have 
sub-federal taxation); for the United States, I use the same 
assumption as the above analysis. Corporate tax revenue data are not 
available for all countries, and not all countries with estimates are 
shown here.60 
This table is based on an extension of this analysis to other 
countries without low tax rates, finding that the tax revenue cost from 
profit shifting for these countries was about $280 billion in 2012.61 
These large magnitudes of corporate tax base erosion were 
instrumental in motivating recent Group of Twenty (G20) and 
OECD efforts to address corporate profit shifting. After a flurry of 
work in recent years and nearly 2000 pages of final project reports 
(issued in October 2015), the OECD/G20 process has generated 
recommendations that aim to better connect taxable profits to 
economic activity. 
Yet there are reasons to suspect that profit-shifting problems will 
continue. Country adoption of the OECD suggestions is likely to be 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. at 2. This analysis includes the United States and other countries that 
headquarter a large number of sizable multinational firms. Due to data limitations, some of the 
assumptions behind these estimates are more speculative than in the U.S. analysis. Most 
developing countries are not considered in this analysis; see Crivelli, supra note 52, for an analysis 
of the revenue costs of profit shifting for developing countries. 
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partial and incomplete, and the suggestions themselves are also partial 
and incomplete. The task faced by the OECD was difficult indeed; 
establishing the source of income is a daunting task in a world where 
firms are globally integrated and much economic value is intangible. 
These difficulties are compounded by the large pools of financial 
resources and talent being directed toward global tax minimization. 
Small armies of accountants and lawyers are busy developing new 
strategies for tax avoidance, often several steps ahead of government 
treasuries as well as international efforts to improve tax base definition. 
The OECD/G20 effort is certainly a helpful step toward greater 
international cooperation in this vexing area, and some of the 
recommendations, such as country-by-country reporting, are 
significant. Still, it remains to be seen whether these steps will be 
enough to stem the growing problem of tax base erosion due to profit 
shifting. Eventually, countries may turn to more fundamental reforms. 
V. REFORM OPTIONS 
A. Why Bother? 
Before discussing reform options, it is helpful to recall the 
usefulness of the corporate tax in the broader tax system. Otherwise, 
there would be the temptation to throw up one’s hands and allow the 
corporate tax to wither away, leaving firms as tax competitive as 
possible. Yet a healthy corporate tax is important for several reasons. 
The corporate tax is an essential tool for taxing capital income. 
Without a corporate tax, much income of profitable firms would go 
untaxed since  many equities are held in tax-exempt form. A majority 
of individual passive income is held in tax-exempt form through 
pensions, retirement accounts, life insurance annuities, and non-
profits, and new evidence suggests that perhaps as little as one-quarter 
of U.S. equities are held in accounts that are taxable by the U.S. 
government.62 In addition, replacing corporate taxation with 
individual taxation would either worsen the lock-in problem for capital 
 
 62. Steven M. Rosenthal & Lydia S. Austin, The Dwindling Taxable Share of U.S. 
Corporate Stock, TAX NOTES 926 (May 13, 2016), http://www.taxpolicycenter. 
org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000790-The-Dwindling-Taxable-Share-
of-U.S.-Corporate-Stock.pdf; see also Leonard E. Burman & Kimberly A. Clausing, Is U.S. 
Corporate Income Double-Taxed? (Nov. 2016) (working paper). 
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gains or necessitate mark-to-market taxation.63 Mark-to-market 
taxation would raise liquidity concerns and increase the instability of 
the tax base in times of market fluctuations. Further, without a 
corporate tax, the corporate form could also provide a tax-sheltering 
opportunity, particularly for high-income individuals. Sheltering 
opportunities exist when corporate rates fall below personal income 
tax rates and corporations retain a large share of their earnings.64 
The corporate tax adds progressivity to the tax system. Corporate 
taxes fall primarily on shareholders and capital-owners, not employees. 
The best cross-country evidence shows no clear link between levels of 
corporate taxation and wages.65 A review of the prior literature and an 
exhaustive examination of cross-country evidence is provided in other 
articles by the author; no wage effects from corporate taxation were 
found.66 Even if the corporate tax were to fall partially on labor, it is 
important to note that most alternative tax instruments to finance 
government fall entirely on labor. 
Further, capital income is far more concentrated than labor 
income, and capital income has become a larger share of GDP in 
recent decades, making the corporate tax an important part of the 
progressivity of the tax system.67 Since income inequality has increased 
dramatically in recent years,68 the equity case for taxing capital is 
stronger. In addition, recent economic theory has buttressed the 
 
 63. Mark-to-market taxation would tax capital gains based on the current market value of 
an asset, even if gains had yet to be realized. 
 64. JANE G. GRAVELLE & THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL34229, CORPORATE TAX REFORM: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2011), 
http://www.cfr.org/united-states/congressional-research-service-corporate-tax-reform-issues-
congress/p26926.  A reduced corporate tax rate of 27% would provide sheltering opportunities 
for corporations that distribute less than 73% of their earnings. Id. 
 65. Cross-country evidence is needed to consider the open-economy tax incidence 
mechanism that suggests capital will move in response to taxation, lowering the marginal product 
of labor and wages in high-tax countries. 
 66. See Kimberly A. Clausing, In Search of Corporate Tax Incidence, 65 TAX L. REV. 433, 
434 (2012); Kimberly A. Clausing, Who Pays the Corporate Tax in a Global Economy? 66 NAT’L 
TAX J. 151, 152 (2013). 
 67. This is confirmed by several different sources documented in Jacobson and Occhino. 
Margaret Jacobson & Filippo Occhino, Labor’s Declining Share of Income and Rising Inequality, 
ECON. COMMENT., Sept. 25, 2012, 1, 1–2. Data collected from the BEA, the BLS, and the 
CBO confirm these trends. 
 68. KIMBERLY A. CLAUSING, WASHINGTON CENTER FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH, 
STRENGTHENING THE INDISPENSABLE U.S. CORPORATE TAX 21 (2016) (summarizing income 
inequality trends), http://cdn.equitablegrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/12110
047/091216-corporate-tax.pdf. 
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efficiency case for taxing capital.69 This work suggests that the 
economic rationale for robust capital taxation is alive and well.70 In 
models with real world features such as finitely-lived households, 
bequests, imperfect capital markets, and savings propensities that 
correlate with earning abilities, capital taxation has an important role 
to play in an efficient tax system. 
Henceforth, I will take as given the desirability of preserving the 
corporate tax. The remainder of the Article will discuss fundamental 
reform options for the corporate tax, focusing on three possible 
reforms: 1) a move toward a purer territorial system, 2) a worldwide 
consolidation system, and 3) formulary apportionment.71 
B. A Tough Territorial System? 
As discussed above,72 a territorial system could easily raise tax 
burdens on foreign income for U.S. multinational firms. Yet the 
multinational corporate community advocates for a territorial system 
that would instead lighten the U.S. tax treatment of foreign income, 
and the political process may indeed generate such an outcome. While 
moving toward the pure territorial end of the tax system spectrum 
would reduce any concerns about competitiveness and tax 
disincentives for repatriation, it comes with a distinct downside. In 
particular, exempting foreign income from taxation entirely would 
dramatically relax the remaining constraint on shifting income abroad; 
this downside has the potential to generate large revenue losses. 
A tough territorial system would be a better compromise between 
competing tax system goals, though it may generate political economy 
concerns if one expects the “toughness” to be challenged or eroded 
over time. Still, there are several ways to combine a territorial system 
(that would remove the lock-out effect on repatriating dividends) with 
 
 69. Kimberly A. Clausing, The Future of the Corporate Tax, 66 TAX L. REV. 419, 425–28 
(2013) (reviewing recent economic theory). 
 70. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, A Theory of Optimal Inheritance Taxation, 81 
ECONOMETRICA 1851 (2013); Emmanuel Farhi et al.,  Non-Linear Capital Taxation Without 
Commitment, 79 REV.  ECON. STUD. 469 (2012); Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The Case 
for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations, 25 J.  ECON. PERSPS. 165 
(2011); Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, A Theory of Optimal Capital Taxation (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17989, 2012). 
 71. Discussion of formulary apportionment and worldwide consolidation borrows from 
prior work produced by the author, including Clausing, supra note 17, at 21–29, and Clausing, 
supra note 3. 
 72. See Supra Part II. 
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base protection measures. Such measures would need to be carefully 
designed so that they are not subject to work-arounds. Fleming, 
Peroni, and Shay offer a careful analysis of some measures that would 
be helpful including an updated Subpart F regime,73 disqualification 
from exemption for royalty income,74 and a realistic allocation of 
expenses to foreign source income.75 Others have emphasized a 
minimum tax approach, including the most recent proposals from the 
Obama Administration.76 Still, Fleming, Peroni, and Shay warn that 
many recent proposals to move toward exemption have fundamental 
weaknesses,77 raising important concerns about base erosion78 and 
profit shifting.79 
Thus, while it is possible to design a “tough” territorial system, 
caution is warranted about whether the requisite political will can be 
mustered to make such a system suitably tough. Since the main push 
for adopting a territorial system comes from business interests that 
would oppose truly “tough” features of a territorial regime, the details 
of any such proposal are crucial. 
C. Worldwide Consolidation 
Under worldwide consolidation discussed by the JCT and favored 
by Kleinbard and Avi-Yonah, a multinational firm would be required 
to consolidate the income earned across the parent firm and its 
affiliates, and all income would be taxed currently, allowing a credit 
for foreign taxes.80 JCT summarizes the approach, applied to the 
United States: 
 
  73. J. Clifton Fleming Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Designing a U.S. 
Exemption System for Foreign Income When the Treasury Is Empty, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 397, 425–
28 (2012). 
  74. Id. at 431–34. 
 75. Id. at 451–52. 
 76. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS 19 (2015), https://www. 
treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2016.pdf. 
  77. Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Territoriality in Search of 
Principles and Revenue: Camp and Enzi, 141 TAX NOTES 173, 174 (2013). 
  78. Id. at 191–203. 
 79. Id. at 189, 203 n.142. 
 80. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 5; Edward D. Kleinbard, The 
Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 TAX L. REV. 99, 101 (2011); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Hanging 
Together: A Multilateral Approach to Taxing Multinationals 1–2 (U. Mich. Law & Econ. 
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The U.S. group would include on its return the foreign 
corporation’s items of income, gain, deduction and loss, the 
character of such items would be preserved, and the foreign tax 
credit would be retained.  
[U]nder the consolidation approach, losses of foreign subsidiaries 
would be included on the U.S. return . . . [and] apply only to U.S. 
corporate shareholders of foreign subsidiaries.81 
One pragmatic issue concerns the degree of ownership that would 
act as a threshold for the required consolidation: options discussed by 
JCT include 80%, 50%, and 10%.82 
A worldwide consolidation approach has several benefits relative 
to the current system: there would be less tax-motivated shifting of 
economic activity or less book income to low-tax locations, since such 
shifting would be less likely to affect a multinational firm’s overall tax 
burden.83 There would thus be fewer concerns about inefficient capital 
allocation or corporate tax base erosion. Also, there would be no 
“trapped cash” problem since income would be taxed currently. 
However, depending in part on the corporate tax rate that would 
accompany this change, the proposal may still raise competitiveness 
concerns for those U.S. multinational firms with rising foreign tax 
burdens under consolidation. Of course, if the U.S. corporate tax rate 
were lowered substantially alongside this change, as proponents 
typically suggest, this would reduce the concerns about 
decreased competitiveness. 
Some also worry that this proposal would put stress on the 
definition of residence. Although some have argued that residence is 
increasingly elective,84 others contend that relatively simple legislation 
would make it difficult to change residence for tax purposes. 
Governments could require that corporate residence indicate the true 
location of the “mind and management” of the firm; Avi-Yonah and 
 
Working Papers, Paper No. 116, 2015), http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_
current/116. 
 81. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 5, at 100–01. 
 82. Id. at 101. 
 83. For firms with excess tax credits, there would still be an incentive to avoid earning 
income in high-tax countries and to instead earn income in low-tax countries. Excess tax credits 
are only likely if the average effective foreign income tax rate exceeds the residence country 
tax rate. 
 84. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, The Rising Tax-Electivity of US Corporate Residence, 64 TAX 
L. REV. 377 passim (2011). 
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Kleinbard suggest that a similar UK definition of residence would be 
effective.85 It is also feasible to develop anti-inversion measures along 
the lines of those suggested above. 
Finally, while there is little real-world experience with such a 
system, it still falls within international norms since it prevents double-
taxation by offering foreign tax credits. The proposal could be 
implemented without disadvantaging major trading partners, and 
adopted unilaterally, though Avi-Yonah recommends that countries 
take a multilateral approach.86 
This proposal has some advantages over simply ending deferral. 
While eliminating deferral (presumably alongside a corporate tax rate 
reduction) would entail some of the same tradeoffs illustrated here 
(less distortion to repatriation decisions, reduced income shifting, 
more efficient capital allocation, potential competitiveness concerns, 
and a greater stress on the definition of residence), it would not truly 
consolidate the affiliated parts of a multinational firm. Under 
worldwide consolidation, for example, if losses are earned in foreign 
countries, they can be used to offset domestic income. 
D. Formulary Apportionment 
Under formulary apportionment, worldwide income would be 
assigned to individual countries based on a formula that reflects their 
real economic activities. Some favor a three-factor formula (based on 
sales, assets, and payroll), but others, including Avi-Yonah and 
Clausing, have suggested a single-factor formula based on the 
destination of sales.87 
The essential advantage of the formulary approach is that it is 
provides a concrete way for determining the source of international 
income that is not sensitive to arbitrary features of corporate behavior 
such as a firm’s declared state of residence, its organizational structure, 
or its transfer pricing decisions. Thus, if a multinational firm changes 
 
 85. Kleinbard, supra note 80, at 156 (2011); see Avi-Yonah, supra note 80, at 7-8. 
 86. Avi-Yonah, supra note 80, at 2. 
 87. E.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Kimberly A. Clausing, Reforming Corporate Taxation 
in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment, in PATH TO PROSPERITY: 
HAMILTON PROJECT IDEAS ON INCOME SECURITY, EDUCATION, AND TAXES 319, 319 (Jason 
Furman & Jason E. Bordoff eds., 2008). As an example, if a multinational company earned $1 
billion worldwide and had 30% of its payroll and assets in the United States but 60% of its sales 
in the United States, its U.S. tax base would be $400 million under an equal weighted formula 
(((.3+.3+.6)/3) * $1 billion), and $600 million under a single sales formula ((.6) * $1 billion). 
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these variables, it would not affect its tax burden under 
formulary apportionment.88 
Importantly, the factors in the formula are real economic activities, 
not financial determinations. Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz; Slemrod and 
Bakija; and Auerbach and Slemrod summarize a vast body of research 
on taxation that suggests a hierarchy of behavioral response: real 
economic decisions concerning employment or investment are far less 
responsive to taxation than are financial or accounting decisions.89 For 
multinational firms, this same pattern is clearly shown in the data. 
There is no doubt that disproportionate amounts of income 
(compared to assets, sales, or employment) are booked in low-
tax countries.90 
In this way, a formulary approach addresses aspects of both the 
competitiveness and tax base erosion concerns. Firms have no 
incentive to shift paper profits or to change their tax residence, since 
their tax liabilities are based on their real activities. However, concerns 
about efficient capital allocation may remain. Under a three-factor 
formula, there is still an incentive to locate real economic activity in 
low-tax countries, which raises concerns regarding efficient capital 
allocation. This is somewhat less of a concern under a sales-based 
formula, since firms will still have an incentive to sell to customers in 
high-tax countries regardless.91 Also, prior experience in the United 
States, which uses formulary apportionment to determine the 
corporate tax base of U.S. states, has indicated that formula factors 
(payroll, assets, and sales) are not particularly tax-sensitive.92 
 
 88. This assumes that the multinational firm has a taxable presence (i.e., nexus) in the 
locations where it has employment, assets, and sales. 
   89. See Emmanuel Saez et al., The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal 
Tax Rates: A Critical Review, 50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 3 (2012); JOEL SLEMROD & JON 
BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES (5th ed. 2008); 
Alan J. Auerbach & Joel Slemrod, The Economic Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 35 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 589 (1997). 
 90. E.g., Kimberly A. Clausing, Multinational Firm Tax Avoidance and Tax Policy, 62 
NAT’L TAX J. 703, 720 (2009); Kimberly A. Clausing, Commentary, The Revenue Effects of 
Multinational Firm Income Shifting, 130 TAX NOTES 1580, 1580 (2011); Clausing, supra note 
3, at 1. 
 91. This is particularly the case for final goods. For intermediate goods, this is 
more problematic. 
 92. See Kimberly A. Clausing, The U.S. State Experience Under Formulary Apportionment: 
Are there Lessons for International Taxation?, 69 NAT’L TAX J. 353 (2016) for an in-depth 
analysis of this question. Whether this tax-insensitivity would hold at higher corporate tax rates 
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If all countries were to adopt formulary apportionment, there 
would be few concerns about competitiveness. Multinational firms 
would be taxed based on their real economic activities (in terms of 
production and sales) in each country, so firms would be on an even-
footing with other firms (based in different countries) with similar 
local operations. If only some countries adopt formulary 
apportionment, it is uncertain what competitive effects would result; 
such effects likely depend on the circumstances of particular firms.93 
Ideally, formulary apportionment would be adopted on a multilateral 
basis. However, if some countries adopt, there are mechanisms that 
would encourage other countries to follow early adopters.94 
Another related approach is to utilize a formulary profit-split 
method. The tax base would be calculated as a normal rate of return 
on expenses, with residual profits allocated by a sales-based formula. 
With careful implementation, such an approach might lessen concerns 
regarding tax competition under a formulary approach. Elsewhere, I 
provide more detail on the advantages and disadvantages of 
formulary approaches.95 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There is nearly universal agreement that the U.S. system of 
international corporate taxation is in desperate need of reform. The 
system is distortionary along many margins, and the U.S. government 
raises less revenue (as a share of GDP) than most peer countries. 
Foreign countries often have tax systems that appear quite different 
than the U.S. tax system: they have lower statutory rates and they 
purport to exempt foreign income from taxation. Still, if we look 
beyond the labels, multinational firms face similar effective tax burdens 
in the United States and elsewhere, and most major countries have 
 
is an empirical question. Still, the forces of tax competition (mobility of production, competitive 
pricing, etc.) are likely stronger between U.S. states than between foreign countries. 
 93. This also generates the potential for double-taxation or double non-taxation, 
although this is also a problem under the present system. 
 94. Avi-Yonah, supra note 87, at 319–44 (explaining that there is a natural incentive for 
countries to adopt formulary apportionment). In particular, once some countries adopt 
formulary apportionment, remaining separate accounting (SA) countries would lose tax base, 
since income can be shifted away from SA countries to FA countries without affecting tax 
burdens in FA locations (since they are based on a formula). See id. 
 95. See generally id.; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, Allocating Business Profits for Tax 
Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 497 (2009). 
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hybrid systems of international taxation, with both territorial and 
worldwide aspects. 
Nonetheless, the U.S. system does have distinctive features: the 
combination of deferral and insufficient base protection measures 
generates vexing problems. These include “lock-out” effects that deter 
firms from repatriating income to shareholders, due in part to hopes 
for more favorable tax treatment in the future; there are also incentives 
to undertake corporate inversions if such hopes appear futile. 
Many observers emphasize the elements of the U.S. tax system 
that are exceptional in order to argue for tax reforms that would bring 
the U.S. system “in line” with those in other countries; such observers 
often fear that U.S. multinational firms have a “competitiveness” 
problem. Yet close inspection of markers of “competitiveness” indicate 
that U.S. multinational firms are competitive, both in terms of narrow 
notions of tax competitiveness and in general. 
Still, the status quo also generates large revenue losses due to 
profit shifting that likely exceed $100 billion per year at present. The 
data suggest that corporate tax base erosion is a substantial and 
increasing problem. Proposals to move the United States toward the 
“pure territorial” end of policy spectrum would make this 
problem worse. 
Better reform options range from incremental proposals to a 
wholesale rethinking of how we tax multinational firms. Incremental 
changes that would improve the U.S. tax system include a lowering of 
the statutory tax rate combined with serious corporate tax base 
protection measures including tougher earnings stripping rules, 
stricter anti-inversion provisions, and minimum taxes on foreign 
income. Such measures would help stem corporate tax base erosion 
and reduce the inefficiencies associated with a high statutory rate. Yet 
none of these measures would address the fundamental problem of 
determining the source of income in a global economy where 
corporate tax-payers are agile and highly globally-integrated. Two 
fundamental reform options show more promise in this regard: 
worldwide consolidation and formulary apportionment. Regardless of 
the reform path chosen, corporate tax reform should pay careful 
attention to details. A healthy corporate tax has an important role to 
play in the tax system for reasons of efficiency, equity, and revenue. 
 
